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We investigate the spread of American foulbrood (AFB), a disease caused by
the bacterium Paenibacillus larvae, that affects bees and can be extremely dama-
ging to beehives. Our dataset comes from an inspection period carried out
during an AFB epidemic of honeybee colonies on the island of Jersey during
the summer of 2010. The data include the number of hives of honeybees,
location and owner of honeybee apiaries across the island. We use a spatial
SIR model with an underlying owner network to simulate the epidemic and
characterize the epidemic using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
scheme to determine model parameters and infection times (including unde-
tected ‘occult’ infections). Likely methods of infection spread can be inferred
from the analysis, with both distance- and owner-based transmissions being
found to contribute to the spread of AFB. The results of the MCMC are corro-
borated by simulating the epidemic using a stochastic SIR model, resulting in
aggregate levels of infection that are comparable to the data. We use this
stochastic SIR model to simulate the impact of different control strategies on
controlling the epidemic. It is found that earlier inspections result in smaller
epidemics and a higher likelihood of AFB extinction.
1. Introduction
Globally, bees contribute immensely to agriculture through crop pollina-
tion. A recent report indicated that 71 out of 100 important crop species are
bee-pollinated [1]. Honeybees (Apis mellifera) are a commercially important
managed pollinator and the most common bee species in the world [2]. The
impact of pollination by honeybees upon the global economy has therefore
been estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars [3,4].
In the past 20 years, there has been a marked increase in the level of disease in
bee populations [5]. The Varroa parasite (Varroa destructor), along with a host of
bacterial pathogens such as European foulbrood (EFB) and American foulbrood
(AFB) [6,7], parasitic insects such as the small hive beetle [8–10] and Tropilaelaps
mite [11] and viruses such as the Kashmir bee virus [9,10] and the Israeli acute
paralysis virus [12], have all been implicated in honeybee colony loss. Such
losses have led to reduced pollination leading to lower crop yields, such as
almonds in California [13]. AFB has been found to be an unusually virulent
pathogen with a high kill rate (see [14]).
In an effort to control disease spread between apiaries, a variety of strategies
have been implemented in the past, with varying degrees of success. Different
strategies are employed by the respective authorities in charge between
countries. In England and Wales, for example, AFB is always treated by burning
infected colonies to eradicate the disease [15]; by contrast, oxytetracycline (OTC)
has been used in the USA since the 1950s, as an antibiotic for treating both AFB
and EFB [16]. An alternative treatment is shook swarm; this involves the trans-
fer of only the adult bees from diseased combs to fresh disease-free equipment,
in order to separate the bees from the disease and avoid total colony destruc-
tion. This method has been considered to be comparable to the use of OTC
in recent years [17–19]. As with any farmed species, the destruction of animals
is always the last resort where all other measures are insufficient to halt the
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continued spread of the disease. An internationally accepted
method for preventing disease spread between apiaries has
yet to be reached.
The disease we investigate here is AFB, caused by the
pathogenic bacterium Paenibacillus larvae, that affects only
the larval stages of honeybees, by infecting them 12–36 h
after hatching and spreading via spores after the death of
the larvae [7,14]. The main mode of AFB transmission is hori-
zontal, via honeybee behaviours such as robbing and the
movement of infected honey stores, as well as indirect bee-
to-bee contact such as contaminated water [14]. This paper
deals with an AFB epidemic that took place during the
summer of 2010 on the island of Jersey, a relatively small
island (with an area of 46 square miles) situated off the north-
west coast of France. All apiarists registered their hives with
the States of Jersey, and thus information about the location
and owner of all hives on the island was known (the wild
population of honeybees is relatively small, and so a complete
dataset was assumed). Visits were arranged to inspect all api-
aries during June (with each apiary containing one or more
hives), and repeat visits in August were made to apiaries
found to contain AFB-positive hives at the first visit.
With the information provided in the dataset, we con-
struct a robustly parametrized spatial SIR model with an
underlying network of ownership. The aim of this model is
to elucidate the main features of transmission and to under-
stand the impact of alternative control strategies. A rigorous
Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology
(using exact likelihoods) is developed to infer distributions
of parameter constants in the model, as well as the infection
time of all AFB-positive hives in the dataset. Similar MCMC
methods have been used to describe livestock diseases
[20,21], but not to our knowledge applied to epidemics in
honeybee populations until now. Our system is also compli-
cated by the lack of owner reporting and the sparsity of the
inspection data. The results of the analysis are tested by
using parameter values from the MCMC in a stochastic SIR
model, and we compare predicted levels of infection in
June and August to those from the data. Finally, a suite of
simulated control strategies are implemented to compare
plausible methods for eliminating or limiting the spread of
future AFB outbreaks.
2. Data and methods
2.1. Data collection
The dataset was acquired by an initial census carried out
between 1 and 18 June 2010, following a report of suspected
EFB on 31 May 2010, which was confirmed to be AFB 3 days
later. Follow-up inspectionswere carried out of infected apiaries
between 8 and 16August; some follow-up inspectionswere also
carried out even if the apiary was AFB-negative. In total, 199
visits were carried out on 130 different apiaries, with a total of
458 hives being examined for AFB. The data collected from
the survey comprised the following information: colony refer-
ence (a unique identifier for each apiary on the island, so
repeat visits can be identified), owner reference (a unique label
for each owner, who may own one or multiple apiaries on
Jersey), number of honeybee colonies at each apiary (this
occasionally changed between inspections, owing to hive
addition or removal), x- and y- coordinates, number of AFB-
positive hives in the apiaryand thedateof inspection.Whenever
an inspection was carried out, if AFBwas presented in the hive,
then the hive was destroyed and the parts scorched, to guaran-
tee removal of the disease. Thus, after reporting an infection, the
hive can no longer transmit infection to other hives.
Although information about the number of combs of brood
and bees was available for some inspections, it was not com-
plete, so we choose not to use the apiary-specific data; instead,
we assume hives are homogeneous with equal susceptibility
and infectiousness.
2.2. Model formulation
We capture the dataset using an SIR model (standing for,
respectively: susceptible, infected, removed). We introduce
the vectors S, I and R to denote, respectively, the creation,
infection and removal times of all hives. For inspections
where AFB is not detected, the time of the negative inspection
is recorded in an additional vectorR2. We label the number of
hives n, and the date of the last inspectionT. Ourmodel adds to
the complexity of the classic SIR model by way of spatial inter-
actions, a network of ownership and stochasticity in the spread
of infection.
Diseases such as foot-and-mouth involve authorities
following up on alerts from farmers [22,23], in which case a
relationship can be assumed between infection time and
detection time. This is not the case with AFB, which can be
hard to identify by sight in the hive by beekeepers; several
reports from farmers received in 2010, who were suspicious
of infected hives, were both revealed to be free of AFB. The
initial inspections were carried out on all hives indiscrimi-
nately as a census; in this sense, AFB is similar to bovine
tuberculosis [24,25] in that it is difficult to detect by farmers.
We use the removal times from the data to estimate infection
times which are, as is often the case with epidemiological
data, unknown.
We allow for a time period where a hive is infected but
not yet infectious; we call this time the latent period, which
we denote as l(t). In theory, any function that increases
from 0 to 1 could be used, such as a step function; for our
model, we choose a more biologically realistic function,
lðtÞ ¼ (1þ e
ð4=uÞðutÞ)1 if t  0;
0 if t , 0;

ð2:1Þ
where 4/u determines the steepness of the switching function
and u determines the time where the switch from infected to
infectious occurs (so as the latency period increases, the
switch from 0 to 1 becomes more gradual).
The disease transmission rate between an infected hive i
and susceptible hive j is constructed as
rij ¼ bðlðKijÞ þ ð1 lÞvAijÞ þ jBij; j [ S; i [ I; ð2:2Þ
with
Kij ¼ K^d2ij þ a2
; K^ s.t.
X
i=j
Kij ¼ n; ð2:3Þ
where b is the overall rate multiplier for the infection rate
from infectious hives to susceptible ones; l is the proportion
of the infection spread due to distance, as opposed to owner-
ship (0  l  1); v scales the amount of infection spread by
the owner (constant and independent of apiary size), while
Aij ¼ 1 if hives i and j have the same owner and is zero other-
wise; jij is additional apiary-specific infectious pressure,
while Bij ¼ 1 if hives i and j are on the same apiary and is
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zero otherwise; a is the distance exponent, which controls
how quickly infectiousness drops off as the distance between
hives increases (smaller values of a cause a more rapid
decline in distance-related transmission); dij is the Euclidean
distance in kilometres between hives i and j (d ¼ 0 for hives
on the same apiary) and n is the number of hives present
on the entire island.
Thus, the total rate of infectious pressure upon a suscep-
tible apiary j at time t is
tjðtÞ ¼
X
IðiÞT
rij  lðt IðiÞÞ þ e; ð2:4Þ
where e is a constant background infection rate, unrela-
ted to the infection status of all other hives. This is to
account for other sources of infection not explicitly covered
in the model, such as immigration of the disease from
abroad and also improves the likelihood calculated in the
MCMC scheme.
As all suspected infections were immediately confirmed
in the field using test kits for AFB (Vita Europe Ltd) similar
to those reported for EFB [26], we assume that the data are
accurate, with no false positives. However, as the disease
takes time to become symptomatic in the hive, we assume
that infections may exist, which were not present in the
data. This may be either because of the inspection being too
soon after the infection reached a particular hive, or because
of infection spreading to the hive between the last inspection
and the end of the inspection period. For the former case, we
introduce a detection probability function independent of
the latency of the disease (2.1), as the ability to detect AFB
in the hive may not correlate directly with infectivity. Thus,
the probability of a positive result given that the hive is
infected with P. larvae is modelled as
DðtÞ ¼ dþ ð1 dÞ(1þ e3ðtdtÞ)1; ð2:5Þ
where d. 0 ensures non-zero probabilities of detection for
small values of t, and td determines where the switch to
almost guaranteed detection occurs. Information about the
detectability of the disease was acquired from contacts on
Jersey and at FERA, and from this we set td ¼ 10 days. Unde-
tected infections in colonies are labelled as occults, following
previous work [20,21]. The MCMC scheme in §2.3 is used to
determine the number of occult infections (if any), which may
exist within the dataset.
2.3. MCMC scheme
We set up a statistical model for analysing our epidemic data,
based on techniques developed by O’Neill & Roberts [27],
designed to analyse spatial epidemic data using Bayesian
MCMC methodology (an applied example is modelling
foot-and-mouth disease in cattle, see [20,21]). The basic
premise involves: setting the model up an initial parameter
set V (i.e. both values for the model constants and infec-
tion times for AFB-positive hives), calculating the initial
likelihood, and then with each iteration altering one of
the parameters, recalculating the likelihood and choosing
whether to accept the new set of parameters based on a
comparison of the likelihoods (for more information in accep-
tance, see appendix A.3). This MCMC algorithm efficiently
explores the whole parameter space, and the sets of par-
ameters accepted define the (posterior) distributions taking
fully into account all uncertainties in the data.
The likelihood is calculated as follows:
LðI;VjR;RÞ ¼
YT
t¼1
Y
j[SðtÞ;
Ið jÞ.t
etj 
YT
t¼1
Y
Ið jÞ¼t
ð1 etjÞ

Y
Ið jÞ,Rð jÞT
DðRð jÞ  Ið jÞÞ

Y
Ið jÞ,Rð jÞT
ð1DðRð jÞ  Ið jÞÞÞ:
ð2:6Þ
The four products are, respectively, the probabilities of
(1) remaining susceptible while under infectious pressure
from other hives,
(2) becoming infected on day t,
(3) AFB being detected at an inspection, where the hive is
diseased, and
(4) AFB not being detected at an inspection, where the hive
is infected but not yet symptomatic.
Prior distributions for all parameters are required to carry
out theMCMCscheme.As no previous analyses have been car-
ried out on disease spread in honeybee populations that we are
aware of, information about likely parameter values is difficult
to find. Thus, gamma distributions were used as priors for all
parameter constants in the model, except where upper limits
could be imposed, in which case beta distributions were used
(for more information see appendix A.2).
The timescale that we choose to work on is from 1 January
2009 (to account for the possibility that AFB was present from
the previous year) until the last inspection date, 16 August
2010. Sources from both the NBU and local bee inspectors
informed us that little to no beekeeping activity generally
occurs outside the March–October period. To account for this,
we assume that no AFB is spread between hives outside the
beekeeping season. To this end, we allocate a four-month
‘freeze’ period over the 2009/2010 winter (1 November 2009–
28 February 2010), duringwhich nodisease transmissionoccurs.
2.4. Stochastic susceptible, infected, removed model
To confirm that the results from theMCMCare reliable, we con-
struct a spatial SIR model, using the coordinates and owner
network from the dataset, with which to test the output from
the MCMC scheme. For each simulation, we require values for
the parameter constants, as well as the initial infection time
and hive. For each run of the SIR model, we randomly sample
a set of parameters from 104 saved outputs from the MCMC
scheme, and allow the model to run until the end of the inspec-
tion period. The primary inspections from the data are used,
andwherever an infection is foundduring a primary inspection,
the hive is removed and a follow-up inspection is carried out on
a random day within the August period (8–16 August 2010).
This is in keeping with the strategies involved during the epi-
demic on Jersey. The validity of the model formulation and
parameters is tested by comparing the predicted total number
of detected infections in the two censuses to the data; this pro-
vides a test that is largely independent of the fitting procedure.
(In appendix A.5, we also show receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves that provide an additional level of validation.)
We then simulate different control strategies and observe
the consequences they have on the spread of AFB. Control
methods are relatively simple to simulate and can provide
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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invaluable insights into their potential to limit the spread of
infection. The inspections carried out in Jersey involved
destruction of any diseased hives immediately upon detec-
tion of AFB. We also test the effects of: performing a
complete census with the follow-up inspections, carrying
out secondary inspections of any apiaries within a fixed
radius of any infected hives [22,28], carrying out secondary
inspections on any hives owned by the same owners, and car-
rying out the initial and follow-up inspections earlier in the
year than the original June and August 2010 (respectively).
We also test combinations of these strategies to find an
optimum strategy.
For a detailed breakdown for the set-up and components
which make up the MCMC scheme, along with the resulting
plots, see appendix A.5.; in §3, we present the main findings
of our analysis of the Jersey data.
3. Results
3.1. Model constants
Figure 6 shows the results of running the MCMC scheme (see
§2.3 for an outline, and §5 for a detailed breakdown of the
methods and complete analysis), to determine credible
values of the model constants. The constants are taken from
equations (2.2) to (2.5), with descriptions given under the
respective equations.
The MCMC chain is well mixed and appears to explore
the parameter space thoroughly. The model constants are
well defined, with Gaussian-shaped histograms. The scheme
was initialized at a variety of regions of parameter space to
test the convergence, and similar values for both the model
constants and the likelihood were consistently observed.
3.2. Characteristics of the epidemic
Using the MCMC scheme, we are able to ascertain various
information about the data from the observed epidemic.
The results are summarized in figure 1.
As shown in figure 1, most apiaries were AFB-negative,
with 46 out of 130 being classed as infected during the
inspection period. Primary cases of AFB appear to be scat-
tered across the island, although most cases tended to be in
the Eastern area and across the north; the south and southeast
regions of the island were relatively AFB-free.
Figure 1b shows the size of the apiaries on Jersey (a larger
number of hives is indicated by a larger radius). Overlaid is
the owner network which connects apiaries owned by the
same beekeeper. By repeatedly running the MCMC scheme,
it is possible to plot the distribution of initial infections, to
estimate where the origin of the AFB outbreak may have
been; the resulting ‘likelihood’ map is also shown in figure 1b.
From the MCMC output, there is a greater frequency of
the initial infection being in either the northeast, the east
or the southwest coastlines, with much higher likelihood
in the northeast. It seems probable based on this evidence
that the AFB infection originated in this area of Jersey. The
specific cause cannot, of course, be ascertained from the data-
set, although probable factors include, for example, the
import of infected honeybees or equipment.
Infection times are resampled during the MCMC, and the
order of infection for hives (including occult hives) are
derived by the scheme. We can also use the changing
infectious pressure throughout the epidemic to calculate
the most probable source of infection for each infected
hive, and whether the infection was more likely to be via
the owner or by distance (by calculating the two terms in
size of apiary with one hive
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
initial infected owner
distance
susceptible
infected (first inspection)(a)
(b)
(c)
infected (second inspection)
infected (both inspections)
Figure 1. Summary of results from the MCMC. All plots show the island of
Jersey with characteristics of the observed epidemic overlaid. (a) The infection
status of apiaries by the end of the 2010 inspection period. The four cat-
egories are susceptible, infected (first inspection), infected (second
inspection) and infected (both inspections). (b) The apiaries present on
Jersey during the 2010 epidemic, scaled by the number of hives present
during the epidemic. Overlaid are the ownership network (black lines) and
the likelihood map for the location of the primary infection during the
AFB outbreak (see colour scale). (c) An example of a typical infection map
obtained from the MCMC scheme (i.e. a random iteration selected from
the scheme). Uninfected apiaries are in yellow, apiaries containing one or
more infected hives are in red, apiaries containing occult hives are in blue.
Arrows show the probable source of infection for each hive; solid white
arrows indicate transmission by the owner, dashed black arrows indicated
distance-based transmission. The initial infection is highlighted.
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(2.2) and picking the larger). The one exception to this is the
initial infection, which from our model set-up must be
infected by random background transmission of AFB. One
such example of the likely spread of infection of AFB from
the MCMC scheme is shown in figure 1.
AFB generally seems to enter the island from the East, with
more transmission events occurring by distance rather than the
owner network. The length of jumps varies quite dramatically;
most are less than 2 km, although there are rare instances
where over half of the island is covered in a single transmission
event. In the example in figure 1c, the majority of transmission
events are due to the owner transmitting the disease (46 infec-
tions, compared to 40 by distance). Most of the longer range
transmissions are caused by owners, although there are seve-
ral infection events by distance that cover a large portion of
the island.
The potential transmission rate of the average hive in the
MCMC scheme was found to be approximately 0.02 hives per
day. We stress that this is not an estimate of R0—as honeybee
colonies are not observed to recover from AFB, a direct
calculation of R0 from the dataset is not possible.
The number of occults present stays relatively low through-
out the MCMC scheme. There are an average of around four
undetected infections by the end of the inspection period, out
of a possible 458 colonies.
3.3. Simulating epidemics
The dataset was generated by inspecting all hives on the
island in the month of June (i.e. a complete census), and
burning any hives that were found to be AFB-positive. This
method of culling is the surest way to remove AFB from
infected apiaries, but it is still not clear whether alternative
measures could be used with increased efficacy in limiting
an epidemic in honeybee populations. Using simulations,
we test alternative methods of dealing with diseased hives,
to find which is the most suitable for dealing with AFB. For
each of the following methods, we use the spatial SIR
model, begin with an infection at one hive (the hive and infec-
tion time are sampled from the MCMC output), and allow
the disease to spread while imposing whatever control
measures we choose. For all control strategies, we follow
the same basic actions as the bee inspectors of Jersey did in
2010. For each control strategy, we run 10 000 replicates of
the SIR model, and then investigate the resulting epidemics.
3.3.1. Standard control practices
Recreating the actions that bee inspectors took in Jersey (i.e.
burning of infected hives, and secondary inspections of
infected apiaries in August) results in the range of epidemics
displayed in figure 2.
As seen in the two histograms, the mean sizes of epi-
demics, at the end of both the primary and follow-up
inspections, are very similar to those observed in the dataset.
This observation increases confidence that our model rep-
resents the true spread of disease, and the reliability of the
parameter estimations in figure 6. This corroboration of a like-
lihood scheme to determine parameter values is not often
observed in the literature, and we consider it important in
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Figure 2. The size of epidemics when standard control strategies are taken. Shown is the mean behaviour, along with the 50th, 80th and 90th percentiles of the
simulation data. The grey area represents the winter 2009/2010 ‘freeze’ period, where the number of infections is fixed and no disease transmission occurs. Over 104
runs, approximately 3% of epidemics were eradicated by the control strategies.
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backing up the choices made when constructing the math-
ematical model for disease spread. Another striking feature
of the graph is that the epidemic is only very rarely stamped
out by the inspection process. In the vast majority of cases,
the June census removes only a portion of the infected
hives, and then numbers begin to rise again during the (unin-
spected) period between the end of June and August, and the
follow-up inspections are usually insufficient to eradicate the
disease (with an average of around 11 undetected AFB-
positive hives by the end of the August inspections). Thus,
it is predicted that AFB was still present at the end of the
inspection period in August 2010. This is corroborated by
beekeepers’ reports of AFB-infected hives the following
year and again in 2012.
3.3.2. Radial inspections
A common practice when dealing with infectious diseases is
to cull all farms, regardless of infection status, within a cer-
tain radius of any infected animals discovered (contiguous
premise culling, see [22]). The logic is that, if the disease
spreads via local transmission, then by eradicating all ani-
mals within a certain distance of any cases, the chances of
the disease spreading further are reduced. The effectiveness
of this strategy is highly dependent upon the pathogen in
question, and the method of transfer from animal to animal.
A course of action which could be taken with regards to
honeybee diseases is to check all apiaries within a certain
radius of any AFB-positive hives found via inspection.
Inspections take place on the same day, in order to reduce
transmission as much as possible. We refer to these extra
checks as secondary inspections. If AFB is discovered with
these extra checks, then those hives are also destroyed, but
otherwise the hives are not burned, and assumed to be sus-
ceptible. Figure 3 shows the size of epidemics when using
such a method for secondary inspections.
The average behaviour of an epidemic is similar until the
start of inspections (as control measures are yet to be
applied), at which point the average decreases dramatically;
by the end of June, the average number of infected hives is
less than half of the value when secondary inspections are
not carried out. By the end of the inspection period, approxi-
mately 90% of simulations result in smaller epidemics than
without secondary inspections on average, as shown in
figure 3a.
An obvious question when following this method of
inspection is what radius is required to make a significant
impact on disease prevalence. Invariably, the amount of man-
power available will restrict how large a radius of secondary
inspections are possible. Figure 3b shows the resulting epi-
demics from using different sized inspection radii, along
with the probability that AFB is wiped out for each radius.
As may be expected, the larger a checking radius that is
used, the more disease is removed by inspections. Both the
average and variance of the size of epidemics decrease as
the size of the radius increases. The probability of wiping
out AFB also increases from around 3 to 48% with a 3 km
radius. It is intuitive that the more inspections that are carried
out, the more infected hives will be detected and burned to
prevent further disease spread; what is less obvious is how
large to make this radius for secondary inspections. Unfortu-
nately, detailed data on the costs of inspections were not
available to us, so a detailed cost–benefit analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth noting
that the entire area of Jersey is only 120 km2, so radii larger
than 3 km would result in large portions of the island being
inspected following detection of an AFB-positive hive (for
example, if the radius was increased to 5 km, each single
radial sweep around an infected hive would cover 78.5 km2,
approximately 65% of the whole island).
3.3.3. Earlier inspections
The number of infections during an epidemic tends to rise
nonlinearly; owing to the initial geometric growth phase of
a typical epidemic, a commonly posed question is how
much the size of the epidemic could have been reduced if
the initial detection had been earlier. If the initial census
had been performed at an earlier stage, in theory fewer
hives would be infected, and so the spread of disease
would be more likely to be reduced. The results of allowing
inspections to be earlier is shown in figure 4.
As expected, earlier inspections lead to the initial dip in
the number of infected hives occurring earlier—during May
in figure 4a, and during March in figure 4b. In March, after
the end of the 2009–2010 winter freeze period, the number
of infected hives is much lower, as AFB has not had the
three extra months to spread before the original June inspec-
tions; thus, the drop in the number of infected hives is less
pronounced than with standard practices (red line). As can
be seen in the June histograms for both plots, there are on
average fewer AFB-positive hives found by the end of the pri-
mary census than were observed during the actual epidemic
(68.8 positive cases in May and 32.2 in March, compared to 70
from the data).
Interestingly, in neither case is the epidemic wiped out the
majority of the time; the lower limit for the 50th percentile
never reaches zero, although it is much lower for the March
inspections than for the May ones. Thus, it seems the epi-
demic is more likely to be wiped out by performing the
census earlier in time. This is confirmed in figure 4c, where
the numbers detected, as well as the percentage likelihood
of epidemic extinction, are plotted against how early the
inspections are. Increasing the time that all inspections are
rewound by has the effect of decreasing the number of detected
AFB cases in the inspection period. This is because the epi-
demic is caught at an earlier stage, so fewer hives have been
infected by the inspection dates. Because of this, the chance
of eradicating the disease completely also increases, shown
by the increasing chance of AFB eradication in figure 4c. The
line is not monotonically increasing; owing to the stochastic
nature of the SIR model, there is some variation in the chance
of extinction. When the primary inspections are carried out
90 days earlier, the average chance of infection is around 9%,
which is roughly equivalent to that when a 0.3 km secondary
inspection radius is used (figure 3b).
3.4. Comparing control strategies
The previous two sections showed in detail the results of run-
ning two different control strategies. Awhole suite of strategies
were implemented, and the overall results comparing the
different schemes are shown in figure 5.
Depending upon the desired result of the control stra-
tegy or the expense of carrying out inspections, different
strategies would be optimal. Generally, the number of infec-
tions decrease the earlier the primary (and follow-up)
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
JR
SocInterface
10:20130650
6
 on July 7, 2015http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
inspections are carried out. This is indicated by the green
points in figure 5a, representing initial inspections in March,
being lower than the yellow points (May), which in turn are
lower than inspections at normal times (June). Apart from
inspections involving a follow-up census, all strategies result
in 500–670 visits; employing a follow-up census pushes the
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number of inspections up to 780–850 inspections. Radial
checks require fewer inspections than owner inspections,
although all scenarios are within 100 inspections. For standard
timing, it is better to do more inspecting early (e.g. radial
checks for all inspections rather than just at the follow-
up inspections), as more of the epidemic is stamped out early
on. Note that in the case of two censuses, fewer inspec-
tions are carried out if inspections are carried out later in
the year; this is caused by more hives being burned
during the initial census (due to the epidemic being at a later
stage), so that there are fewer hives to check during the
follow-up inspections.
Conversely to figure 5a, earlier inspections result in a
highest number of infections remaining at the end of August
(figure 5b). This is due to the extra one or three months that
any infected hives remaining have after the follow-up inspec-
tions in May/July, to spread disease unchecked to other
hives during the remaining time. Thus, figure 5b may give an
unrealistic view on the effectiveness of control strategy if
observed on its own; we also need to look at the probability
of wiping out AFB using the strategies (figure 5c). This
shows a very different trend: making the primary inspections
three months earlier with two complete censuses results in
an extinction likelihood of around 26%, compared to only
2.5% using standard strategies. All other strategies result in
an extinction likelihood of 10% or less, so if wiping out the dis-
ease is imperative, two censuses are required. Generally, for
each control strategy type, the earlier the inspections begin,
the better for controlling the size of the epidemic, as shown
by the regular pattern of increasing chance of extinction in
figure 5c.
4. Conclusion
Our starting point for the analysis carried out here was a data-
set detailing the outbreak of AFB on Jersey during the summer
of 2010. A census in June was proceeded by follow-up inspec-
tions in August, effectively providing two ‘snapshots’ of the
epidemic, from which we attempted to reconstruct the entire
epidemic. Such reconstructions are common for livestock,
where generally data are more widely available [22,23,29],
but are less common for honeybees. Using a Bayesian frame-
work, an MCMC scheme was constructed to calculate both
the parameter constants and infection times (of both known
and unknown ‘occult’ infections, see Jewell et al. [20,21]) of a
spatial SIR model with an underlying owner network, which
we predicted would account for the majority of infection
spread. We then used derived parameter values from the
MCMC scheme to simulate epidemics, resulting in similar-
sized epidemics (on average) as the data implied over the
same time period (figure 2). We then simulated the conse-
quences of implementing different control strategies in
addition to the standard strategy (of burning infected hives
and visiting the apiary two months later to confirm its AFB-
negative status), to see what the best actions would have
been, to reduce the size of the epidemics and/or increase the
chances of wiping out the disease.
The mathematical model we built from the dataset is
shown in §2.2. The results of the MCMC, with likelihood
values calculated from (2.6), are summarized in figure 6
and show several key results. Both distance and ownership
contributed significantly to the spread of AFB during the epi-
demic (shown by the distribution of l in figure 6). This is
confirmed by a sample run of the MCMC, where the most
probable spread of infection is shown (figure 1c). Just over
half of the infection spread was attributed to owner trans-
mission in that instance, with the remaining spread due to
distance. Long-distance transmission of AFB via the owner
has been shown in the past [30], and our results corroborate
this. The analysis also reveals the probability of the epidemic
origin on the island, shown in figure 1b, to be in the north-
east, or with a lower likelihood, in the east or the southwest
of the island. This information could be key in determining
how exactly the epidemic began—if one of the major sources
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Figure 5. The comparison of different control strategies. Three different
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of bee or equipment imports happens to be in the area, then
the evidence heavily suggests that the disease entered the
island via this method. Thus, measures could be taken to
prevent future epidemics.
We constructed a stochastic SIR model to attempt to recre-
ate the epidemic, using appropriate information from the
data. The results were shown to correlate well with the data
(figure 2)—the mean numbers of detected infections, in both
June and August, were very close to the Jersey data, which
shows that the model is a good indicator for the actual trans-
mission process. We consider the forward simulation of
epidemics using the results from the MCMC a key step in
proving the reliability of the derived parameter values. The
range of epidemic sizes over 104 runs is, however, quite
large, and the size of the actual epidemic (i.e. number of infected
hives, not just detected hives) is likely to be significantly larger
than the number of confirmed cases. We thus predict from
our results that the disease was present after the end of the
August inspections, and this hypothesis is backed up by sev-
eral reports of AFB on Jersey the following year.
The control strategies we implemented include secondary
radial checks and earlier inspections. In both cases, the
measures were found to reduce the size of the epidemics and
make disease extinction more likely. In the case of radial
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inspections, carrying out secondary inspections within 3 km of
any confirmed cases resulted in an extinction probability of
approximately 45% (figure 3b); however, the extra manpower
involved to test so many extra hives may make this strategy
prohibitive, and there will be a limit to how large a check can
be carried out in the vicinity of AFB-positive hives. Unfortu-
nately, data on the cost of AFB inspections were not available
to us, so a rigorous cost–benefit analysis for secondary inspec-
tions is beyond the scope of this work.
Carrying out inspections earlier decreased the size of the
epidemic by limiting the amount of initial spread before
inspections began (figure 4a,b). Earlier inspections were also
found to make disease extinction more likely (figure 4c); how-
ever, the increase over the three-month period that we
examined did not lead to as large an increase in the likelihood
of complete AFB removal as the radial inspections; primary
inspections in June gave a 3% chance of disease extinction,
whereas moving them back to March increased the prob-
ability to 8%. This probability is still relatively low, so
further steps would be required to eradicate AFB entirely.
When comparing control strategies, results were mixed.
Given that the first census occurred in June, all control strat-
egies resulted in similar-sized epidemics (figure 5a), and the
actions taken by Jersey bee inspectors resulted in fewer inspec-
tions than any further control strategies. Hence, if the cost of
inspections is a limiting factor, the control measures taken
were appropriate. In terms of limiting the spread of infection,
the earlier the epidemic is discovered and action is taken, the
smaller the resulting epidemic is (figure 5a). However, in prac-
tice with epidemics this is not always possible; depending on
the disease, it may or may not be easily spotted by farmers,
and by the time action is taken the epidemic may have
already taken off. If wiping out the disease is the main aim,
then two censuses are required to increase the chance of
wiping out AFB (figure 5c). However, the number of inspec-
tions required to carry out this strategy is much higher, and
the costs may be too prohibitive for such action to be taken.
We have provided a general framework here which can be
used, in conjunction with economic data about inspections
costs, to provide an optimum strategy to follow for future
epidemics.
Other control measures not carried out in our simulations
include shook swarm methods [17] and the use of OTC as an
antibiotic against AFB and EFB [7,17]. There is no unified
approach to the control of honeybee diseases; for example,
only recently, experimental work has shown the benefits of
shook swarm over OTC-based measures [19], and measures
differ between countries (for comparisons between the
USA, the UK and New Zealand, see [15,16,31]). OTC resist-
ance has been observed in recent experiments [32,33], and
alternative measures to antibiotics have been explored such
as breeding bees for an increased immune response to AFB
[34] and natural alternatives to antibiotics [35,36]. The
reason we chose to avoid simulating extra control measures
is a lack of quantitative data about the effectiveness of
shook swarm and OTC. With more specific data, such control
measures would not be difficult to implement computation-
ally. Depending upon the performance of such control
measures, smaller epidemics may result in the future.
This is the first rigorous statistical analysis carried out on a
honeybee disease epidemic that we are aware of, and several
issues were found. First of all, the methods of disease trans-
mission that we accounted for included: distance, owner,
within-apiary and random (background) transmission. A
more rigorousmodelwould include other links to facilitate dis-
ease transmission, such as apiarists sharing equipment and
hive movement between apiaries. Unfortunately, this required
much higher resolution data than we possessed; livestock
movement data are usually well documented (see [22,37]),
and in our model, we assumed all hives stay in the same
apiary for the period of the simulation. Information about
imports of bees (which is controlled by legislation on Jersey,
and a licence required for the import of queens) would no
doubt be useful in determining the likely origin of epidemics,
especially for an island such as Jersey where bees are unlikely
to travel from other locations (although one beekeeper did
report seeing a swarm travelling mid-Channel between
Jersey and France, highlighting the possibility of honeybee
influxes from mainland Europe).
Nevertheless, as a starting point, we believe that our analy-
sis shows great potential in helping to limit future epidemics in
honeybees. We have established clear links between both
proximity and ownership and the spread of AFB, and shown
the speed at which the epidemic probably grew. There is a
very high probability that the disease was present from the
previous year, but at low enough numbers to go unnoticed.
We have also shownhow controlmeasures can be used tomini-
mize the size of the overall epidemic. In the future, we hope to
use the statistical framework established in this analysis
to investigate the spread of EFB in England and Wales, using
data available since 1993. It is hoped that a much larger data-
set will enable us to provide more robust conclusions, and
comparisons between the spread of EFB and AFB could poten-
tially lead to different control strategies needed to reduced
the size of epidemics. Finally, the fact that all these findings
can be revealed from two spatial snapshots of the infection
status suggests that these techniques can be applied to a
wide range of outbreak scenarios without the need for costly
high-resolution temporal data.
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Appendix A
A.1. Model construction
The overall aim of any MCMC scheme is to try to reconstruct
the series of events which took place, leading to the dataset
possessed at present. For this, an appropriate model which
captures the behaviour of the system accurately is paramount
for good results. In the case of epidemic data, it is thus impor-
tant to capture the main methods for the spread of the
disease, in order to have a high chance of recreating the epi-
demic. As we have information about both the geographical
location and owner of each hive, it makes sense to use this
information in construction of the function for disease
spread. Owing to a lack of knowledge about the relative
strengths of distance and ownership in the transmission of
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disease between hives, we set up our transmission function as
rij ¼ bðlðKijÞ þ ð1 lÞvAijÞ þ jBij; j [ S; i [ I; ðA1Þ
In this way, 0  l  1 shows the relative amount of spread due
to the two factors—the closer to 1 that l is, the more important
the proximity between hives is for infection spread. We
include j as an extra pressure which applies between hives
on the same apiary—this is due to extra interactions which
may occur at the within-apiary level, such as bees travelling
between neighbouring hives, acting as a vector for AFB.
With the inclusion of disease latency and the background
transmissions of disease, the infectious pressure upon any
hive is thus given by (2.4).
The likelihood function for our epidemic has to take the
following probabilities into account:
— susceptible hives staying uninfected, either for the entire
inspection period (in which case we set I( j ) ¼ T þ 1) or
from the beginning of the inspection period until I( j ) (if
I( j )  T );
— susceptible hives becoming infected at time t, under
infectious pressure from other hives or random infection;
— infected hives being detected when an inspection takes
place; and
— infected hives not being detected when an inspection
takes place (i.e. false negatives).
We model the inspection period as a discrete-time pro-
cess, with each step being 1 day; this is logical, as the
inspection data are categorized by the date each inspection
occurred. In discrete time, we convert our infectious pressure
(2.4) into a probability of infection, which is a Poisson process
with probability
PðinfectionÞ ¼ 1 eRatedt: ðA2Þ
For a detailed method of dealing with discrete-time
models, see [38]. The likelihood calculation is thus
LðI;VjR,RÞ ¼
YT
t¼1
Y
j[SðtÞ;
Ið jÞ.t
etj 
YT
t¼1
Y
Ið jÞ¼t
ð1 etjÞ

Y
Ið jÞ,Rð jÞT
DðRð jÞ  Ið jÞÞ

Y
Ið jÞ,Rð jÞT
ð1DðRð jÞ  Ið jÞÞÞ:
ðA3Þ
Here, the first term is the probability of not being infected on
day t, which is 1 P (infection) from (A 2), while the second
term follows (A 2) exactly; both terms involve summing over
all hives. The third and fourth terms correspond, respectively,
to AFB-positive hives being detected and not detected,
following the detection function (2.5).
Initially, owner compliance was included in the model,
which allows for owner-based transmission to be reduced
once inspectors were made aware of the presence of AFB and
alerted farmers. However, it was not significant to the model
results (i.e. there was no information gained from the likeli-
hood scheme) and thus was not included. We hypothesize
that the nature of the data collection (i.e. returning only to
infected apiaries in August rather than a second complete
census of all hives) provided insufficient information to test
for owner compliance.
A.2. Prior distributions
To set up the MCMC scheme, we must first set initial values
for all our parameters; the job of the MCMC algorithm will
then be to calibrate these parameters, and the output tends
to the most probable system configuration. For our model,
the unknowns are the constants in the model (b, l, a, j, u, e)
and the infectious periods for all confirmed infected hives.
As well as this, we attempt to locate any occult infections
which were not detected during the inspection period.
In the case of the constants, values must be positive. For
parameters with no obvious upper limit, we choose priors
to be gamma distributions,
Y  Gð1; 5Þ: ðA4Þ
By definition l needs to be in the range [0,1] so we use a
beta distribution as our prior,
Y  Betað2; 2Þ; ðA5Þ
centred at 0.5. With information from FERA and the bee
inspection team from Jersey, we assume an upper limit of
20 days for the latency period. Thus, we use a modified
beta distribution as our prior for u,
Y  20  Betað2; 2Þ: ðA6Þ
For setting infectious periods, we opt for either shifting
infection times by 1 day either side or picking random
values from an exponential distribution (see §A.3).
A.3. MCMC Algorithm
We are now ready to run the MCMC scheme. As likelihood
values tend to bevery low, it is beneficial (formachine accuracy)
to work with log likelihoods, henceforth denoted by L. The
initial likelihood is set extremely low, Lold ¼ 2106. There are
five possibilities for the adjustment of parameters in our
scheme, and one adjustment is chosen at each iteration. In gen-
eral, whatever step is taken, we calculate the new likelihood
after the change (Lnew), before calculating the following value:
A ¼ Lnew  Lold þQ; ðA7Þ
where Q is the proposal distribution (e.g. [39]). Generally, Q is
made up of two components: the probability of picking the
old value given the new value, and the probability of picking
the new value given the old value. Together, these give
Q ¼ ln PðxoldjxnewÞ
PðxnewjxoldÞ
 qðxnewÞ
qðxoldÞ
 
; ðA8Þ
where q(x) is the prior distribution for the parameter x (this can
be either a model constant or an infection time).
The new set of parameters is accepted if A. u, where
u  U [0,1]; in other words, the new parameters are definitely
accepted if A. 0, and with probability eA if A, 0. The
method of updating values, along with the calculation of the
value ofQ is as follows for the five different parameter changes:
(1) Varying the value of one of the model constants. We
choose one of the model constants at random, and move
a small amount from the old value of the constant. We
sample from a normal distribution and add this value to
the old parameter value
xnew ¼ xold þNð0;sxÞ; ðA9Þ
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where the variance s is proportional to the initial value of
the constant; initial values used are estimates of the con-
stants from preliminary runs of the MCMC, so constants
with higher initial values have higher variances. As we
are using a symmetrical distribution to calculate the new
value, the first fraction of (A 8) is 1.
(2) Varying the infection time of some of the infected hives.
This involves first picking a random number of infected
hives to resample infection times for. Secondly, we
resample infection times for each hive; for this we
either move the infection time either side by 1 day, or
sample from an exponential distribution
Rð jÞ  Ið jÞ  expðgÞ: ðA10Þ
For early iterations, infection times are often generated
by moving 1 day to either side of the old time, so that
we explore the parameter space of infection times
thoroughly. As the number iteration increases, times are
resampled more frequently from the exponential distri-
bution (A 10). We set g ¼ 200 days for sampling infection
times from, to allow a wide range of infectious periods.
We also impose an upper limit of 300 days, such that infec-
tious periods are resampled if a period greater than 300
days is calculated.
(3) Introducing an infection to one of the susceptible hives,
and setting its infection time (known as an occult infec-
tion). A susceptible hive is selected at random to
become infected, and the infectious period T 2 I( j ) is
sampled from a uniform distribution
T  Ið jÞ  UðRð jÞ  30;TÞ: ðA11Þ
This is subtracted from the end of the inspection period T
to give the infection time. We use a uniform distribution
instead of the exponential distribution (A 10) for occult
infections, as an occult is extremely unlikely to be infected
long before the inspection date; we assume a 30-day limit
before the inspection. The value of Q for a new infection is
adapted from Jewell et al. [20,21] and is defined as
Q ¼ jI . Tj  ðT  R
ð jÞ þ 30Þ
jOj þ 1 ; ðA12Þ
whereO is the numberof occults before the current addition.
(4) Removing one of the occult infections. The value of Q is
again adapted from Jewell et al. [20,21] and is defined as
Q ¼ jOjðT  Rð jÞ þ 30Þ  ðjI . Tj þ 1Þ : ðA13Þ
(5) Varying the addition or the removal time of one of
the hives which is not present for the entire inspection
period (as the numbers of hives in apiaries sometimes
varied between inspections without explanation). As
the lower and upper limits for the removal/addition
time are fixed (as the two inspection dates R1 ð jÞ and
R2 ð jÞ), we simply use a uniform distribution
Cð jÞ  UðR1 ð jÞ þ 1;R2 ð jÞ  1Þ; ðA14Þ
where the time of the change C( j ) must be after the first
inspection day and before the second. As we are
sampling from a uniform distribution, Q ¼ 0.
The parameter change that we choose is selected from the
above five options such that infection times are resampled
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Figure 7. Plotting model constants against each other. Note that although upper and lower diagonal plots are symmetric, axis scaling can differ, leading to
variations in the shapes of scatter plots.
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with a higher frequency at the beginning of the MCMC
scheme. Thus by the time we start to vary other parameters,
we are more likely to be in the right region of parameter
space for the infection times of diseased hives.
A.4. MCMC output
For the MCMC scheme to have explored the multi-dimen-
sional parameter space thoroughly, we allow the scheme to
run for 1.8  106 iterations, including a burn-in period of
2  105 steps where values are not recorded. The results are
shown in figure 6.
The plot of the log-likelihood varies throughout the iter-
ations, as expected in an MCMC scheme, with the values
distributed roughly around log(L) ¼ 2800. The shape
confirms that the parameter space is being explored
thoroughly, with an acceptance of 56.3%. This acceptance
rate is higher than the ideal acceptance range of 16–40%,
although we highlight that the quoted range is applicable
when only step 1 of theMCMC scheme is carried out (i.e. alter-
ing parameter constants, see §5), and the acceptance rate for
this step alone is 29.2%. The histograms for themodel constants
mostly have Gaussian shapes, with the exception of 50%
latency day, which is more evenly spread over the 20-day
period. The histogram for l is centred around 0.6, meaning
that just over half of all transmission is due to distance-
dependent transmission rather than by owner. Thus, both
pathways are significant in controlling the spread of AFB.
To test for parameter independence, we plot the model
constants against each other, producing a set of cloud plots
(figure 7).
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Figure 8. Summary of comparing the model results to the data. (a) ROC curves showing the sensitivity of the model results to the data (solid blue line). Also shown
are the zero correlation line (dashed-dotted red line), the 95% prediction limits from the model (dashed green lines) and median from the model (solid green line).
Marked on both the model–data comparison and model median lines are the locations of c ¼ 0.25, c ¼ 0.5 and c ¼ 0.75. (b) Bar chart showing a comparison of
the proportion of times an apiary is infected in the model, dependent on whether it is infected in the data for the June census.
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A.5. ROC curves
To test the reliability of the SIR model used to simulate
epidemics, we plot ROC curves to test the sensitivity and
specificity of the model compared to the data, along with a
histogram comparing the infection status of the model and
data (figure 8).
The ROC curve is formulated by defining a cut-off c
between 0 and 1; apiaries are determined to be positive, if
they are infected in more than a proportion c of simulations
and negative otherwise. The ROC curve is then drawn by
varying the value of c. For all c. 0.5, our ROC curve lies
above the diagonal line, showing that our simulations have
better than random predictive accuracy.
The constants appear to be independent, with little
covariance between them (i.e. positive and/or negative corre-
lations). This corroborates our model formulation.
However, our modelling methodology is not a simple
statistical fit to the data (in the traditional sense), but aims
to generate the underlying mechanistic processes driving
transmission. For this reason, simple measures of agreement
between predictions and data are not readily applicable,
especially given the stochastic variation between simulations.
To overcome this issue, we also use the ROC curve to assess
how well the model performs at predicting a single model
simulation (i.e. treating one simulation from the model as
the true data), and use this comparison to generate mean
and 95% prediction intervals of this ideal (green lines in
figure 8a). This model–model comparison highlights the
effects of stochasticity and provides an upper bound on
what could be achieved even if the model perfectly captured
the underlying mechanisms. We find that the ROC curve that
compares model and data lies within the 95% prediction
intervals of what can be expected for c. 0.5.
Finally in figure 8b, we separate apiaries that we found
positive in the June census (red) from those found negative
(blue). For each of these, we show frequency histograms of
the proportion of simulations in which an apiary is infected.
Clearly, apiaries positive in the June census are more likely to
be infected in the model, while apiaries rarely infected in the
model are generally ones where AFB was not detected.
The difficulty of forming a simple statistical comparison
between model and data is complicated by two main factors:
(i) the variability in model results due to both the stochastic
nature of transmission but also the uncertainty in parameter
values from the MCMC scheme; (ii) the fact that the observed
epidemic is simply one realization of the possible epidemics
that could occur, and there is no reason to believe that this
was in any way a typical epidemic.
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